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In the current renaissance of dialogue and debate concerning science 
and religion, there is a significant presence of process thinkers. 
Important scholars in this field embrace a process perspective, even if 
they modify some aspects. Examples of this position include Ian 
Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, John Haught, and Phil Clayton, although 
each one of these authors modifies traditional Whiteheadian positions to 
some degree. It is good to have in this volume by Griffin are-statement 
of the classical Whiteheadian position in the current religion and science 
dialogue. I recommend this work to anyone interested in the topic of 
process theology and natural science. Taken together, these books rep-
resent a major summary of Griffin's philosophy, and stand as a fitting 
capstone to his career at Claremont. 
Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, edited by Wm. Lane Craig and J. P. 
Moreland. London and New York: Routledge, 2000. Pp. ix and 286. $90 
(hardcover) . 
RICHARD CREEL, Ithaca College, Ithaca, New York 
Naturalism: A Critical Analysis is a valuable volume for those who 
would like to bring themselves up to date on criticisms of naturalism as a 
worldview and on the comparative merits of theism as a worldview. The 
eleven authors of this volume are convinced that under extended scruti-
ny the philosophical naturalism that dominated the philosophical scene 
for most of the twentieth century has now been shown to generate dilem-
mas and have costs that are daunting at best and prohibitive at worst 
whereas theism is proving to be quite resilient. Each of the ten chapters 
of Naturalism was written by a different author (the first article is co-
authored). The first three chapters are on epistemology, the next four on 
ontology, the eighth on value theory, and the last two on natural theolo-
gy. Three aims shared by most chapters are (1) to identify phenomena or 
problems that naturalism has not dealt with adequately, and perhaps 
cannot deal with adequately, (2) to explain why a consistent naturalism 
must be strictly physicalist and therefore eschew emergent, supervenient, 
mental, and abstract properties and entities, and (3) to show that philo-
sophical theism is a more comprehensive and adequate world view than 
is philosophical naturalism. Most of these authors have published exten-
sively on the topics about which they write in Naturalism, so to some 
extent their articles (written for this volume) serve as valuable introduc-
tions to and updates of their work. In such a short review I cannot sum-
marize and critique each of ten wide-ranging, technical articles, so I have 
chosen to summarize each chapter without critique. The title of each 
chapter precedes my summary of it. 
Farewell to philosophical naturalism 
Paul Moser and David Yandell begin by posing a dilemma for natural-
ism. If naturalism cleaves to strict physicalism, it cannot account for the 
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universal, normative nature of its claims about what there is to know and 
how it can be known. If, however, it moves away from strict physicalism in 
order to accommodate the universality and normativity of its claims about 
what we can and cannot know (and consequently of what it is rational to 
believe to exist), then it must incorporate non-naturalistic concepts and 
cease to be naturalistic. From this dilemma M& Y (Moser and Yandell) con-
clude that naturalism is inadequate at best and self-refuting at worst. Next 
M& Y point out that naturalists justify their ontological naturalism by means 
of methodological naturalism, which is the belief that "every legitimate 
method of acquiring knowledge consists of or is grounded in the hypotheti-
cally completed methods of the empirical sciences." M&Y argue that in 
order for naturalists to justify MN (methodological naturalism) within their 
naturalistic framework, they must show either (1) that MN is justified by 
empirical evidence to date or (2) that it will be justified by the completed 
methods of the empirical sciences. With regard to (1) they point out that 
MN is not a thesis of any of the empirical sciences and that the empirical sci-
ences do not make the kinds of universal, normative claims that MN makes. 
Furthermore, the empirical sciences do not make claims about the non-
empirical, as do MN and ontological naturalism (ON). Hence, current sci-
ences do not empirically support MN or ON, and neither do they support 
the highly speculative (wishful?) thesis that when the methods of the sci-
ences have been completed, they will vindicate MN and therefore ON. 
Knowledge and naturalism 
Dallas Willard believes that "narrower Naturalism or unqualified 
Physicalism cannot find a place for knowledge, truth, logical relations or 
noetic unity." The normative aspects of knowledge and belief formation, 
Willard argues, cannot be replaced "by mere descriptions of actual process-
es of belief formation." Moreover, truth is a necessary condition of knowl-
edge, and for a thought or statement to be true "is simply for its subject 
matter to be as it is represented or held to be." But physical properties never 
represent anything. Therefore, in the world as understood by naturalism 
there could be no truths, belief, or knowledge. But there are beliefs, truths, 
and knowledge. Therefore, Willard concludes, naturalism is a false world-
view. Willard, like Moses and Yandell, also has interesting things to say 
regarding the purported support of naturalism by science. 
The incompatibility of naturalism and scientific realism 
Robert Koons argues that scientific realism is incompatible with philo-
sophical naturalism because "nature is comprehensible scientifically only if 
nature is not a causally closed system-only if nature is shaped by super-
natural forces (forces beyond the scope of physical space and time)." 
Crucial to Koons' position is his argument that reliability is an essential 
ingredient of knowledge because "the proper function of belief-forming 
processes is to form true beliefs, so the sort of process which fulfills this 
proper function must be a reliable one." Therefore, anyone who believes 
that a method of belief formation is reliable-that is, for the most part pro-
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duces in us correct representations of the world because it (the method) 
connects us to the world in appropriate ways-must have an understand-
ing of reality which justifies believing that the epistemic success of the 
method is reliable and not merely lucky. Koons argues that a theistic 
ontology provides warrant for believing that scientific methods are reliable 
whereas a naturalistic ontology does not. 
Naturalism and the ontological status of properties 
J. P. Moreland argues that the issue of the ontological status of prop-
erties is the Achilles heel of naturalism. He begins by agreeing with 
naturalist D. M. Armstrong that internal, i.e., mental properties "are 
not reducible to natural, physical, causal/ functional entities." He pro-
ceeds by noting that according to Armstrong, if naturalists would be 
consistent, they should deny the existence of internal relations. 
Therefore, Moreland concludes, "the best naturalist theory of knowl-
edge or justification (or warrant) will be externalist" and exclude men-
tal properties. "Weak naturalists" try to escape this harsh conclusion 
by introducing notions such as emergence and supervenience. 
Moreland, like Moser, Yandell, and Willard, argues that such a move is 
inconsistent with naturalism. Yet "strong naturalism" (strict physical-
ism) is inadequate because it cannot accommodate first person intro-
spection and certain mental properties. After critiquing the naturalist 
theories of properties of D. M. Armstrong and Keith Campbell, Willard 
concludes with an exposition of the strengths of traditional, non-natu-
ralist property realism. 
Naturalism and material objects 
Michael Rea's startling thesis is that "material objects as they are ordi-
narily conceived have no place whatsoever in the strict ontology of a 
consistent naturalism." The concept of a material object, Rea argues, is 
the concept of something that must have "persistence conditions," and 
the persistence conditions of an object are necessary truths "about what 
changes it can and cannot survive." Hence, belief that a material object 
exists entails belief that necessary truths are instantiated. Because natu-
ralists limit warranted belief about what exists to what can be ascer-
tained empirically, and because the instantiation of a necessary truth 
cannot be ascertained empirically, therefore naturalists have no right to 
believe in the existence of material objects. Rea's second argument is 
based on his contention that belief in the existence of mind-independent 
material objects is justified only for those who believe that some object in 
space/time belongs to a natural kind. We are justified in holding that 
belief only if we believe the object has or is a proper part or has a proper 
function. Naturalism, however, cannot identify a proper part or function 
of any thing because the pertinent notion of "proper" is normative in a 
sense that empirical methods cannot accomodate. Hence, naturalists 
cannot justify belief in the existence of material objects. 
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Naturalism and the mind 
After a brief critique of eliminativism, Charles Taliaferro provides an 
extensive critique of non-eliminativist naturalism, which retains belief in 
mental phenomena but claims they are a species of physical phenomena, 
and hence are compatible with naturalism. Taliaferro presents numerous 
thought experiments to show that mental properties/states and physical 
properties/states are distinct and therefore not identical, and that various 
mental states cannot be understood satisfactorily by means of biological, 
chemical, or physical categories. Taliaferro concludes by discussing the 
naturalist claim that metaphysical dualism is "queer" or "anomalous." He 
acknowledges that from within the worldview of naturalism the existence 
of non-physical mental events, properties, or entities will seem anomalous. 
If, however, one's worldview is theism, then the existence of non-physical 
mental events, properties, etc., is not anomalous at all, as theism holds that 
consciousness and intention have not emerged from an initially conscious-
less, purely physical reality. Rather, a non-physical consciousness preced-
ed, conceived, and willed the existence of the universe, so the existence of 
creatures with non-physical minds and wills should be no surprise. 
Naturalism and libertarian agency 
Stewart Goetz argues that in order for libertarian freedom to be real, "a 
substantial self (mind or soul) which makes a choice for a purpose must 
exist at the deepest level of reality and be able to causally interact with the 
ultimate or deep entities of the physical world" so that "on those occasions 
when an agent chooses for a reason, events at the micro-physical level of the 
world occur only because a soul causes them to occur in accomplishing its 
goals." Because such libertarianism presupposes substance dualism, it is 
incompatible with philosophical naturalism. Goetz defends the intelligibili-
ty of his non-causal account of libertarian agency by arguing that teleologi-
cal explanation is as legitimate as causal explanation. Goetz concludes with 
a critique of naturalists who claim that mental events and states supervene 
upon physical events and states. What is sometimes not noticed, says 
Goetz, is that naturalists have not explained how subvenient physical prop-
erties give rise to mental properties. Some naturalists, like David Chalmers, 
even concede that it is a category mistake to think that the categories of neu-
rophysiology could ever explain how mental properties arise from physical 
properties. Goetz counters that if naturalists think their inability to explain 
how the physical gives rise to the mental need not cause them to abandon 
naturalism, then they should not think that the inability of dualists to 
explain how a non-physical volition gives rise to a physical effect requires 
them to abandon dualism. 
Naturalism and morality 
John Hare argues that modem western moral theory consists of three 
parts. First is the moral demand for impartiality, for treating others as 
equal to oneself in one's moral deliberations and actions. Second is the 
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recognition that our natural capacities are unequal to fulfillment of the 
moral demand for impartiality. However, because we believe we can do 
what we ought, the third part of modem western moral theory consists of 
belief in a holy being who can enable us to meet the moral demand. 
Noting that secular, as well as religious, ethicists recognize the moral gap 
problem, Hare critiques three secular strategies for dealing with the moral 
gap. He concludes by arguing that "moral faith" is necessary to sustain 
our commitment to being moral in the midst of temptations and suffering. 
Moral faith consists of two convictions. The first is that every human can, 
with divine aid, become morally good. This conviction keeps us from giv-
ing up morally on ourselves or others. The second conviction is that with 
divine aid it is possible to be both moral and happy. This conviction helps 
sustain moral resolve by assuring us that self-denial and suffering for the 
sake of morality are ennobling and only temporary. 
Naturalism and cosmology 
The question at the heart of William Lane Craig's contribution is, "Why 
does the universe exist rather than nothing?" Craig argues that naturalists 
cannot answer this question as well as theists can. He begins by explaining 
why the Big Bang model of creation is so widely accepted among cosmolo-
gists; then he argues that the evidence on which the Big Bang model is 
based requires belief that the universe (including energy, matter, time, and 
space) has not always existed but, rather, came into existence a finite time 
ago. Next Craig critiques numerous alternatives to the Big Bang theory, 
including the Steady State Theory, the Oscillation Theory, Vacuum 
Fluctuation theories, Chaotic Inflationary theories, Quantum Gravity theo-
ries, and the Self-Creation Theory-each of which is fascinating, but none 
of which, according to Craig, can avoid both horns of the following dilem-
ma: either the universe began with a singularity which came into existence 
from nothing but was caused to begin to exist or once upon a time 
absolutely nothing existed and then the universe came into existence 
uncaused. To embrace the latter hom of this dilemma is to embrace absur-
dity. To embrace the former hom is to embrace supernaturalism. 
Naturalism and design 
A consistent, thoroughly physicalist naturalism excludes design and 
purpose from all explanations. However, William Demski argues, in order 
to explain some things satisfactorily, even in biology, design must be 
added to necessity and chance; therefore naturalism is false. A pattern 
indicates design when two things have been established: complexity and 
specification. "Complexity ensures that the object in question is not so sim-
ple that it can readily be explained by chance." In addition to complexity 
there must be a pattern that "specifies" (is indicative of) intelligence at 
work. It might seem that notions of "sufficiently complex" and "involving 
a pattern indicative of intelligence" are either question begging or imprac-
tically vague, but these criteria, Dembski points out, have long been used 
effectively in forensic activities such as detective work, forensic medicine, 
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cryptography, and archaeology, and are now being formalized by people 
in the intelligent design movement. Demski concludes his contribution, 
and the volume, by drawing on the work of biochemist Michael Behe to 
argue that acceptance of the possibility of design in natural systems will 
enrich science, not stifle it. 
Referring to God: Jewish and Christian Philosophical and Theological Perspectives, 
(ed.) Paul Helm. St Martin's Press, 2000. ix + 175. $65.00 
TIM BA YNE, Macquarie University. 
Although both the title of this volume and its introduction suggest that its 
concern is with issues that lie at the intersection of philosophy of language 
and inter-religious dialogue, readers looking for sustained discussion of 
these topics will be disappointed. Four of the seven chapters are based on 
papers (and their commentaries) delivered at a conference on Christian 
and Jewish philosophy of religion, but forays into inter-religious dialogue 
are infrequent, and only one contribution - Joe Houston's "William Alston 
on Referring to God" - explicitly engages with the question of how refer-
ence to God is secured. 
In fact, the papers included in this volume form a rather mixed bag. In 
"The Source and Destination of Thought" John Haldane presents an argu-
ment for God's existence based on concept-acquisition. Jerome Gellman 
has two papers in this collection. In "Identifying God in Experience: On 
Strawson, Sounds and God's Space" he responds to objections against 
experience-based arguments for God's existences by drawing on some 
ideas in Strawson's Individuals. In his second paper, "Judaic Perspectives 
on Petitionary Prayer" Gellman develops a model of petitionary prayer 
based on the idea of holding God to his promises. Eleonore Stump con-
trasts the theodicies of Aquinas and Saadia, a tenth century Jewish philoso-
pher, in "The God of Abraham, Saadia and Aquinas," and in "Maimonides 
and Calvin on Accommodation" Paul Helm examines the different roles 
that Maimonides and Calvin assign to equivocation in their accounts of 
religious language. 
Rather than attempt to say a bit about each paper, I will restrict my com-
ments to two contributions: Haldane's "The Source and Destination of 
Thought" and Houston's "William Alston on Referring to God". Haldane 
develops a semantic version of the cosmological argument, what he calls 
the "Prime Thinker" argument. According to Haldane, neither of the two 
standard naturalistic accounts of concept-acquisition - abstractionism and 
innatism - are satisfactory. More promising is the Wittgensteinian view 
that concepts are acquired through the learning of general terms. But, says 
Haldane, this explanation generates a vicious regress: "The 
Wittgensteinian proposal that concepts are inculcated through member-
ship of a linguistic community ... is not itself ultimately explanatory 
because for any natural language user it requires us to postulate a prior 
one. This regress will be halted if there is an actualising source whose own 
